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Book Reviews

his call to keep dreaming of a socialist world, but they do begin to address mo
concretely and realistically the question posed in his title.
GARY DORRIEN, Kalamazoo College.

BURNS, J. PATOUT, ed. War and Its Discontents: Pacifism and Quietism in the Abraham

Traditions. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996. xi+221 p
$55.00 (cloth).

What does it mean to ask whether Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, in the wor
ofJ. Patout Burns, "define[s] standards according to which the recourse to arm
either for conquest or in defense of life and justice, would be forbidden? Mig
they encourage, approve, or at least allow a pacifist stance in the contemporar
world order?" (p. x)? If "a pacifistic stance" means preferring peace to war a

encouraging others to do the same, the authors embrace too many diver

groups. Advocates of Cold War realpolitik preferred peace to war and amasse
military stockpiles, deployed nuclear weapons, and projected American might
encourage others to do the same. Muslims, Christians, and Jews have for cent

ries insisted on absolute limits to initiating and prosecuting war, while recognizin

that it may, nonetheless, be a lamentable necessity. Thinkers of the democrat
left, like Michael Walzer, may abhor war without being "quietist" or "pacifistic

Even just war thinkers of the far right maintain that military conquest is forbidde
Perhaps it would be more useful to ask whether the various traditions forbid thei
adherents either to join in or endorse military force used by the public authoritie

against armed threats to justice and the integrity of the community-one way
drawing the distinction between pacifism and the just war tradition-or reco
nize noninvolvement in the armed defense of justice and the community as
faithful stance within the tradition-a tentative characterization of quietism.
Put in these terms, pacifism turns out to have little credibility, quietism a b
more. Thus, Michael Broyde, surveying the Jewish traditions, insists that "the
logical pacifism has no place in the Jewish tradition" (p. 19). Everett Gendler
Yehudah Mirsky, and Naomi Goodman emphasize the Jewish commitment to
peace, instance cases of martyrdom, risk-taking, and nonviolent strategies as wa
of responding to aggression and injustice, without seriously challenging Broyde
central claim. Similarly, Abdulaziz Sachedina, while insisting "that Islam is n
monolithic," concludes nonetheless that "pacifism in the sense of rejecting a
forms of violence and opposing all war and armed hostility before justice is esta
lished has no place in the Qur'anic doctrine of human faith" (p. 147). Justice
God's unequivocal demand and cannot be forsaken by God's community. Quie
ism, in contrast, is a legitimate "strategy for survival in minority communiti
with the hope of regrouping and reasserting their ideals ofjustice" (p. 148).
Sachedina insists on the theological point that "the search for peace and inte
gral existence" without acknowledging the absolute priority of God's demand
"has proved to be fatal in human history" (p. 157). Faithfulness is emphasized
from the Christian perspective by Edward Gaffney, who sees the triumph of "sec
ular pacifism" in the Vietnam-era courts as an impediment to selective conscie
tious objectors, thus shielding imperial America from its most serious critics (p
186-89). Gaffney's concerns relate closely to those of John Yoder, who has lon
emphasized the eschatological context of the Gospel narrative and the danger
for the church inherent in the "constantinian temptation" to see in the state t
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The Journal of Religion
principle agent of historical fulfillment. That the Christian shoulders the "scandal
of the cross" emphasizes the profound gulf between Yoder's pacifism and the
natural desire to pursue justice and protect those we love. Reflected in several
essays here, including Yoder's, is an unfortunate trend toward using '"justifiable
war" as an alternative to "just war." Only just wars, those fought with proper authority, just cause, right intention, and the rest of the traditional criteria, are ever
justifiable. If the wars from which we have benefited were unjust, then we benefit
to our shame, but that scarcely supports Walter Wink's proposal "that we termi-

nate all talk of 'just wars'" (p. 116). To claim, as Wink does, that "Christians can
no more speak of just war than of just rape, or just child abuse, or just massacres"
(p. 116), is dangerously confused, as well as an affront to the Catholic tradition,
represented here by John Langan. It is also a symptom of that debasement of our
political discourse that worries Gaffney. Wink represents the sort of simpleminded Christian liberalism that drove Reinhold Niebuhr out of the Fellowship
of Reconciliation. Oddly enough, this makes his the most instructive essay in the
volume. If pacifists and advocates of nonviolent strategies for social justice fail to
distance themselves from shoddy argument and rhetorical posturing, they risk
damaging their credibility and thus their cause.
G. ScoTrr DAVIS, University of Richmond.

REEDER, JOHN P,JR. Killing and Saving: Abortion, Hunger, and War. University Park:

Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996. 237 pp. $35.00 (cloth); $16.95
(paper).

John Reeder stands in that admirable line of moral philosophers who, even in
these postmodern times, are not ready to throw in the towel. Conceding the incommensurability of various conflicting foundational premises, both secular and
theological, Reeder nonetheless argues that the current moral landscape yields a
coherent "consensus" on such divisive issues as abortion, physician-assisted suicide, warfare, and obligation to the starving-those wrenching questions of life
and death which Reeder appropriately takes to be interrelated.
Reeder's consensus, put briefly, presupposes a conception of "rights" (whether
rooted in Kantianism or Aristotelianism or theology), including not only a (waivable) right not to be killed, but also a right to receive aid. Reeder's rights premise
serves as an initial check to a utilitarian calculus that is otherwise legitimate.
Thus, except in some specified override situations, one may not kill an individual
person to save many others, but one may redistribute preexisting threats so as to
destroy the fewest number. Therefore, in discussing two oft-juxtaposed hypotheticals, Reeder insists that a surgeon may not slay one patient to harvest vital organs

for five, but a passenger on a runaway trolley headed toward five people may
redirect the trolley onto a spur where it will kill one. Similarly, Reeder retains the

double-effect test. Except in the "Nazi override" case (where the future of any
rights-based civilization is on the line), one may not deliberately kill noncombatants to demoralize the enemy, but one may do obliteration bombing of a legitimate military target in the sure knowledge that noncombatants will be killed, so
long as, under a proportionality test, lives thereby saved are not outweighed by
lives taken. (Similarly, in traditional Catholic thought, one may remove a cancerous uterus knowing the fetus will die, although one may not directly kill a fetus.)
Is consensus achieved? Reeder's approach is that of the analytic philosopher,
proceeding by way of comparative hypothetical example. At that analytic level, I
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